On March 27th of this year President Obama announced that after a careful policy review he and his Administration had adopted “a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan,” He promised that unlike President Bush’s, his policy would be successful. It would defeat the Taliban and, “enhance the military, governance and economic capacity” of Afghanistan.

Since then Mr. Obama has gone wobbly and is having second thoughts about his careful, well thought out strategy. Last March he said, “Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan.” Now he’s not so sure whether he’s willing to pay the price necessary to strengthen Pakistan militarily and politically or to win the Afghan War.

Part of Obama’s problem seems to be one of definition. He has mixed strategy with tactics. Strategy has to do with long range planning. Tactics has to do with the short range art and science of maneuvering forces on the battlefield. Once strategy is set it should be followed to the end of the war, or at least to the end of a phase of the war.

In World War II the strategy adopted was that once the war in Europe was won, only then could maximum effort be directed toward winning the war in the Pacific. Obama doesn’t seem to realize that strategically the train has left the station and his opportunity to successfully change course is limited.

His March strategy made a lot of sense then and still does today. He was correct when he said, “To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban’s gains, and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government … the world cannot afford the price that will come due if Afghanistan slides back into chaos.”

In Afghanistan in some cases we can win the hearts and minds of tribesmen and villagers by providing civil security and improved economic and living conditions. In other instances hearts and minds will follow only after strong coercion has been exercised. 

Each situation is unique and must be handled differently. Tactics have to be varied and tailored to meet the requirements of the peculiar state of affairs in each district or area. What works well in one valley or village, may not work over the mountain in the next valley or village.

I address some of these considerations on pages 175 and 176 of my book: From Private to General: An African American Soldier Rises Through the Ranks:

“After this victory, 41st ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) combat operations continued in high gear. The regiment continuously located and destroyed well entrenched VC (Viet Cong) units. Perhaps Binh Dinh Province will be pacified after all, I mused.

Often during those weeks, (Colonel) Vy returned to the subject of my departure. He seemed obsessed with it. Finally one evening at supper he blurted out, ‘Colonel Curry, you must not stay here as my advisor.’

‘Don’t look so grim, Colonel,’ I said. ‘I am staying. You can count on it. The last few months your regiment has killed more VC, captured more enemy weapons, and won more battles that any other ARVN regiment in the corps. I really mean it when I say that I am proud to serve with you.’

Sadly he replied, ‘Thank you my friend. I appreciate your sincerity. But I must beg you to leave as quickly as possible. If you do not,’ his head dropped, ‘I shall be relieved of my command … We Vietnamese military commanders work on a cycle,’ he explained. ‘When a new U.S. Advisor arrives, I instruct the regiment to pretend that it doesn’t know how to conduct combat operations. The advisor always prescribes extensive training, just as you did when you arrived ...’

‘Are you saying that all the U.S. advisors who leave Vietnamese units after six or seven months, and who think that they have accomplished so much, have in reality been manipulated?’

‘Yes,’ he slowly explained. ‘So long as elementary training and squad-level operations are taking place, the regiment suffers few casualties. When combat operations are stepped up, more of my soldiers are killed or wounded,’ His dark brown eyes pleaded for understanding … ‘To my superiors, keeping casualties low is more important than killing VC. If I do not immediately reduce the numbers of our casualties, I will be relieved of my command.’

‘Let me be sure I understand. The United States of America is risking the lives of its sons and daughters and spending exorbitant amounts of U.S. taxpayer’s money, to help South Vietnam win your war as quickly as possible, so you can preserve your nation’s freedom. But your commanders’ objective is to minimize Vietnamese military casualties?’

‘Precisely...’

‘You understand that this undermines the whole purpose of my country’s sending military forces here to help your country?’”  Page 106 also provides some interesting insights.

It is neither Obama’s second thoughts nor his search for a successful strategy that will decide whether or not his war in Afghanistan will be won. It is whether or not he and America’s allies have the patience and flexibility, and are willing to pay the price necessary to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda and at the same time off-set recent insurgent gains in Pakistan.